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ABSTRACT 
SUPPORT FOR GESTALT VERSUS BUSINESS-AS-USUAL THEORIES OF 
INSIGHT DEPENDS ON OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF INSIGHT 
 
Kimberly Diane Lee 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash  
 
 
Some theories propose that insight involves automatic processes that are responsible for 
restructuring. Other theories postulate that the mechanisms surrounding restructuring are 
controlled and effortful. The current study tested these theories by comparing different 
methodology and operational definitions that have been used in previous research to 
investigate the nature of “Aha!” experiences and impasse in insightful problem solving. 
One hundred two undergraduate psychology students from Old Dominion University 
completed working memory tasks, six classic insight problems, and gave initial problem 
representation ratings for the insight problems before solution attempt. Using a think-
aloud protocol, we assessed the occurrence of impasse during the problem solving phase. 
After solving each problem, participants completed self-reported, measures of the Aha! 
experience—solution confidence, how sudden a solution appeared, and the effort 
required. Results demonstrated distinctly different response patterns between self-
reported ratings of insight and the empirically coded measure of impasse when compared 
with all other variables of interest. This suggests that the Aha! ratings lack construct 
validity as an assessment of insight. Further, we replicated contradictory working 
memory correlations found in previous research with the self-report ratings and impasse 
coding, suggesting that discrepancies in the literature were the result of how insight was 
 assessed. These findings call into question previous research utilizing self-report Aha! 
ratings.  
 Keywords: insight, problem solving, working memory, impasse, Gestalt 
psychology 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Everyone has experienced sudden insight—that flash of understanding that seems 
to come out of nowhere, from a place where no progress was being made; the Aha! 
moment. These experiences feel qualitatively different from non-insightful problem 
solving, e.g., solving an arithmetic equation, and researchers have long investigated 
whether these two types of problem solving involve qualitatively different cognitive 
processes. And if so, whether the feelings associated with the Aha! experience are truly 
indicative of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
 Theories of insight have evolved into two competing classes: theories that stem 
from Gestalt psychologists who proposed special, automatic processes that are specific to 
insightful solutions (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Fleck, 2008; 
Stellan Ohlsson, 2011) and theories that propose no differences between insightful and 
non-insightful problem solving (Chein & Weisberg, 2013; Davidson, 1995; Gilhooly & 
Murphy, 2005; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). As detailed in Ash, Cushen, and Wiley (2009), 
difficulty in researching the insight phenomenon has resulted in various methodologies 
and operational definitions of insight. We propose that these differences are responsible 
for some of the conflicting evidence produced in the literature. The current study aimed 
to reconcile these differences by testing predictions based on competing theory while 
directly comparing several operational definitions of insight.  
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Historical Perspective 
 As an emerging scientific field, psychology was rooted in Associationist views 
that became increasingly stringent over time (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 2012). Culminating 
with Behaviorism, this approach was confined to observable behaviors and their 
contingent causes from the external world. Internal mental processes that might affect 
learning and behavior were dismissed as unknowable or, at the most extreme, 
nonexistent. Behaviorists attempted to explain all learning as a gradual, passive process 
in which co-occurring stimuli become associated with a desired outcome. Thorndike's 
(1911) famous "puzzle box" experiments exemplify this type of learning. For these 
experiments, Thorndike created special puzzle boxes in which a cat was required to 
activate some type of mechanism, e.g., a wire pull or a foot treadle, to gain freedom. To 
begin, the cat would try many ineffectual means to escape the box. Eventually, it would 
randomly release the correct mechanism and was rewarded with escape from 
confinement. When returned to the box, the cat would again engage in ineffectual 
activities until randomly alighting on the correct mechanism. Over time, the random 
activities decreased as the cat slowly learned to associate the correct mechanism with the 
door release.  
 It was from this constrained backdrop of Associationist learning theory that the 
Gestalt movement was born. Gestalt theorists were dissatisfied with the notion that 
human behavior could be wholly explained by passive, external connections. They 
proposed that the internal representation of a problem or situation was paramount to the 
external environment. Koffka (1935) spoke of two types of environments that influence 
behavior: the geographical and the behavioral. The geographical environment 
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encompasses the physical world and all the specific elements therein, e.g., the color, 
texture, and weight of surrounding objects. The behavioral environment is how a person 
interprets this information to form a mental representation which can depend on many 
things including what they choose to focus on in the environment, the goals that are 
motivating them, and their knowledge and previous experience with the environment or 
its objects.  
 It is the changes that take place in the behavioral environment that were of 
particular interest to the Gestalt psychologists. They believed that to solve certain types 
of problems, a reorganization of the initial mental representation must occur, a process 
known as restructuring (Duncker & Lees, 1945; Maier, 1931; Wertheimer, 1954/1959). 
They also proposed that insight—the sudden realization of a problem's solution—follows 
restructuring. Köhler (1948) was the first to demonstrate what appeared to be this type of 
insightful learning. In one of his best-known experiments, Köhler provided a chimpanzee, 
Sultan, with two hollow rods and bananas that were just out of reach from his cage. The 
bananas could not be obtained by using either rod individually, but could be reached by 
inserting the end of one rod into the other to create one long rod. Sultan unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain the bananas by using one of the short rods, a strategy that had 
previously worked. He continued in this vein for an hour before giving up, having 
reached impasse, a point in which active problem solving ceases and the solver is unsure 
how to proceed. While sitting, he examined the rods and happened to hold them in a 
straight line. Upon seeing the line, he inserted the end of one rod into the other and 
immediately went to retrieve the bananas. In Gestalt parlance, the unsuccessful, single-
rod technique was part of the initial, inappropriate problem representation which was 
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later, after impasse, restructured to include the successful, double-rod strategy. Unlike 
Thorndike’s cats, which required numerous trials to gradually associate the stimulus with 
the desired outcome, Sultan appeared to experience one-trial learning as he immediately 
connected the poles in future attempts. One-trial learning is at odds with Behaviorist 
learning theory and Köhler's experiments lent credence to the idea of insightful learning. 
 Gestalt psychologists turned their attention to insightful problem solving in 
humans, which required the development of laboratory techniques that would allow for 
insight to occur. Insight problems are a particular type in which the problem itself 
typically induces an inappropriate mental problem representation. The creation of this 
faulty representation goes beyond the scope of the actual parameters presented in the 
problem. Prior problem solving experience leads a solver to make assumptions about the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Gestalt theory of insight problem solving presented in an information 
processing framework (Ash & Wiley, 2006).  
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constraints of the problem space as well as additional operations or rules that must be 
followed. The correct solution is not obtainable from this inappropriate representation 
and the solver may reach a point in which they are no longer making progress towards the 
goal state. After reaching this impasse, the problem representation must be restructured in 
order to realize the correct solution (see Figure 1 for a diagram of the Gestalt view of 
insight problem solving presented within an information processing framework).  
 Duncker's (1945) candle problem experiment illustrates this type of insight 
inducing problem. In this experiment, participants were given candles, a matchbox with 
matches, and some tacks. They were asked to affix the candle to the wall without 
allowing wax to drip. In one condition, participants were given the matchbox with the 
matches inside while the other group received an empty matchbox with the matches 
separate. He found that participants were much more likely to solve the puzzle—tacking 
the matchbox to the wall for use as a shelf for the candle—if they received an empty 
matchbox. The full matchbox reinforced the function of the matchbox as a container, an 
inappropriate mental representation for this problem reinforced by previous learning, and 
fixation on this function made it more difficult for the participants to restructure their 
problem representation to find the correct solution. Early researchers continued to make 
contributions supporting the Gestalt concept of insight (Maier, 1931; Wertheimer, 
1954/1959), but were not without detractors anchored in Associationist theory. This 
conflict is echoed in modern insight problem solving research.  
The Current State of Insight Problem Solving Research 
 Currently, there is a division in the literature regarding the processes that underlie 
insight problem solving, specifically, restructuring. Restructuring is typically unnecessary 
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in analytic, non-insight problems as the goal state can be reached through strategic means 
from the initial, correct problem representation (e.g., arithmetic, Tower of Hanoi task). 
As such, it is key to investigating processes that may be specific to insight. Some 
researchers have proposed that automatic processes, such as spreading activation in 
semantic memory (Ohlsson, 1992; 2011), chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation 
(Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999), and switching between fine- and course-
grain processing (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), are responsible for restructuring (Ash & 
Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 2008; Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Others subscribe to the 
Business-As-Usual theory which posits that insightful problem solving is no different 
from analytic problem solving and the mechanisms involved in restructuring are 
controlled and effortful (Chein & Weisberg, 2013; Davidson, 1995; Gilhooly & Murphy, 
2005; Kaplan & Simon, 1990). To facilitate discussion, Gilhooly and Murphy (2005) 
provided a useful framework for this debate: a dual process model.  
 Dual process models have been established as viable approaches to conceptualize 
thinking (Evans, 2003, 2011; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). These models 
distinguish between two systems of processing. System 1 is associated with automatic, 
fast processing which is not under conscious control or subject to the limitations of 
working memory. System 2 is associated with deliberate, sequential processing and is 
constrained by the demands of working memory. Evans (2008) advocated a semantic 
change that relates this division as types of processing as opposed to systems of 
processing. He reasoned that though the processes associated with System 2 are relatively 
stable across the literature, the processes labeled as System 1 are widely varied and better 
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conceptualized as types of processes that fall under the umbrella of the attributes 
associated with it.  
 Investigations specific to the debate surrounding the Type 1 or Type 2 processes 
involved in insight problem solving often depend on working memory performance. 
Working memory is a system that allows for temporary storage and management of 
information (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). It is constrained by a very 
limited capacity and is typically measured by performance on a primary task while 
concurrently managing a secondary task. This methodology is used to measure an 
individual's capacity for controlled processes, such as focusing attention. By correlating 
working memory, the hallmark of Type 2 processing, to problem solving performance or 
to certain stages of the problem solving process, researchers can infer whether Type 1 or 
Type 2 processes are dominant.  
Working Memory and Restructuring 
 Ash and Wiley (2006) recognized that Type 2 processes are involved in the 
insight problem solving process even within the scope of automatic restructuring theories. 
They argued that insightful solutions begin with the same strategic, analytic procedures 
used in non-insightful problem solving which are employed within the initial search 
phase through the faulty problem space. These procedures utilize Type 2 processes as the 
solver directs attentional resources towards accomplishing their goal. Accordingly, both 
automatic restructuring theories and Type 2 restructuring theories allow for the impact of 
individual differences in working memory on insight problem solving ability when 
considering the entire process, though only Type 2 restructuring necessitates it. To 
investigate restructuring within this line of reasoning, Ash and Wiley isolated the 
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restructuring phase with an experimental approach. They designed two sets of matched 
insight problems. Matching problems shared the same instructions, but more importantly, 
shared the same representational change that must occur during restructuring to find the 
correct solution, i.e., the problems were solved in the same manner. The difference 
between the two sets was that one set was simplified so that the initial faulty problem 
space was small and exhausted almost immediately. The other set allowed for many 
possible moves within the initial faulty problem space so that it took more time before the 
solver exhausted the problem space and came to impasse. By effectively eliminating the 
pre-impasse stage from the simplified set, Ash and Wiley could make inferences about 
the restructuring phase by comparing solving ability from the two sets with working 
memory capacity. They found that working memory correlated to solution rates for the 
large initial problem space set, with higher working memory span participants solving 
more insight problems, but did not correlate with the small initial problem space set. As 
Type 2 restructuring would predict a relationship between working memory and both 
problem sets, these results were interpreted as relating Type 2 processes to the initial, 
faulty search phase, but not with the restructuring phase, supporting the Gestalt theory of 
automatic restructuring. 
 Ricks, Turley-Ames, and Wiley (2007) explored the relationship between 
working memory and compound remote associates (CRA) problems. These problems 
were originally developed for the Remote Associates Test by Mednick (1968) as a way to 
test creative problem solving. As this type of problem can be experienced as either an 
insight or non-insight problem depending on individual differences, they have become a 
popular means of studying insight (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Cunningham, 
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MacGregor, Gibb, & Haar, 2009; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006). In a 
CRA problem, the solver is presented with a set of three seemingly unrelated words, e.g., 
aid, rubber, wagon. They are then tasked with finding a fourth word that will pair with 
each of the three cue words. In this example, band is the correct solution: band-aid, 
rubber band, bandwagon. Successful CRA solutions require the solver to efficiently 
search long term memory stores to produce solution attempts, reject inappropriate 
solutions, and keep the inappropriate solutions from interfering with subsequent searches. 
As these processes are managed by Type 2 mechanisms, Ricks et al. argued that 
individual differences in working memory would predict CRA performance. But they 
were particularly interested in the idea that increased working memory capacity could 
sometimes handicap the CRA problem solving process. They posited that the increased 
attentional focus afforded to participants with higher working memory spans could 
amplify inappropriate response fixation.  
 To test this hypothesis, Ricks et al. used two sets of CRA problems: a neutral set 
and a set that was designed to mislead the solver into selecting an inappropriate, 
knowledge domain-oriented response. They then explored the effect of working memory 
in solvers who had differential levels of domain knowledge on these two sets. They found 
that working memory did predict solution success in the neutral set as well as with 
solvers with low domain knowledge in the domain misleading set. But solution success 
was significantly hampered in the domain misleading set for participants with high 
working memory spans and high levels of domain specific knowledge, who solved even 
fewer CRA problems than participants with average working memory. These results 
confirmed that Type 2 processes are involved in CRA problem solving, as well as 
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indicated that the working memory sub-processes responsible for individual differences 
are linked to attentional focus. However, it is important to note that this study examined 
CRA problems in general and did not attempt to differentiate between insightful and non-
insightful solutions.  
 Fleck (2008) compared insight and analytic problems using measures of fluid 
intelligence, verbal and spatial short term memory, and working memory. Restructuring, 
defined here as representational change from the initial problem representation to the 
final solution, was assessed through a verbal protocol in which solvers verbalized their 
problem solving process and through retrospective reports. To begin, Fleck confirmed 
that restructuring took place at a high frequency in the insight problems, but low 
frequency in the analytic problems. She also found that working memory strongly 
predicted solution success in analytic problems, but not in insight problems. However, 
insight solutions were predicted by verbal short term memory, a component of working 
memory, which was not predictive of analytic success. These results provided evidence 
of distinct processing between analytic and insightful solutions and were interpreted as 
support for automatic restructuring theories.  
 Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) also found support for process differences between 
insightful and analytic problem solving. Using a large problem set—much larger than 
previously used in this line of research—they investigated the relationship between 
problem type and verbal working memory, spatial working memory, inhibition, and 
switching. They found that both verbal and spatial working memory predicted solution 
success in insight problems, but the executive functions of inhibition and switching did 
not. For analytic problems, they found that working memory as well as switching 
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contributed to problem solving. These processes differences were interpreted, in part, as 
support for automatic restructuring. However, it is important to note that Gilhooly and 
Fioratou relied on previous research to define insightful versus analytic problems and did 
not attempt to assess the actual occurrence of restructuring.  
 Chein and Weisberg (2013) used a self-report method to identify the occurrence 
of insight in CRA problems. After solving a problem, they asked participants to rate their 
problem solving experience on a 4-point Aha! rating scale anchored at Strategy and 
Insight. They explained that a problem solved by strategy is one in which the solver 
comes upon the correct solution unawares, and only through an effortful, strategic 
process, e.g., a trial-and-error process, can the solver confirm the accuracy of the 
solution. Sudden insight "means that as soon as you thought of the word, you knew that it 
was the answer. The solution word came with a feeling that it was correct ('It popped into 
my head'; 'Of course!'; 'I had an Aha!')" (Appendix B, para. 1-3). Responses were then 
used to categorize problems as analytic or insightful. They found that working memory 
positively correlated to solution success in problems classified as insightful, a finding 
they argued indicated the presence of Type 2 processes throughout the entire problem 
solving process. They also found that solution times were significantly faster for 
problems identified as involving insight. This is at odds with the Gestalt view which 
predicts slower solving times for insightful solutions since a solver must first exhaust a 
faulty problem space before obtaining the solution. These results were interpreted as 
support for Type 2 restructuring and the Business-As-Usual theory. 
  
12 
 
Assessing Restructuring 
 Insight problem solutions are often distinguished by the Aha! experience. Unlike 
analytic problems in which incremental progress is felt, insight solutions seem to occur 
unexpectedly with little to no prior feeling of progress being made towards the goal state 
(Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987). This sudden solution realization can be accompanied by a 
strong feeling that is typically described as an Aha! experience or a Eureka! moment. 
Because of the challenges inherent in experimentally isolating stages of the problem 
solving process or even in identification of the insight phenomenon, this subjective Aha! 
experience is often used to determine the occurrence of insight, and more specifically 
restructuring.  
 Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) used these feelings to establish correlations 
with neurological activity during CRA problem solving, developing the first instance of 
the Aha! rating scale (also, Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). After solving each problem, they 
asked solvers to rate their problem solving experience on a single continuum in terms of 
strategy versus insight. They found sudden bursts of brain activity just prior to solution 
realization in problems that were identified as occurring with an Aha! experience, but not 
with problems that were solved strategically. As the activity preceded the solution, these 
bursts were interpreted as an automatic process occurring beyond the solvers control. 
 As previously described, Chein and Weisberg (2013) used a streamlined version 
of this measure in their work. But this Aha! rating scale has the potential to create 
confounded results. The anchors do not reflect a single construct leaving room for 
subjective interpretations and response confusion that would not be available in a scale 
anchored between extremes, e.g., Not and Very. Further, several constructs are inherent in 
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the instructions: solution confidence, how sudden a solution manifests, and the amount of 
effort involved in the process. If these constructs are not highly related, results would be 
influenced by which component felt most pertinent at the time of the rating. For example, 
a participant who happens to solve a problem quickly and easily, without impasse or 
restructuring, would likely choose an insight rating because they did not feel the process 
was effortful or that they actively employed a strategy. Or perhaps they interpreted 
suddenness in terms of how quickly they obtained the answer. Conversely, a solver who 
realizes the solution after impasse and restructuring, may choose a strategic rating 
because they expended a lot of mental resources and tried many strategies before coming 
to the solution. 
 At no point in previous research has the validity been assessed for this scale. Even 
if the three constructs inherent in the scale consistently relate with one another when 
assessing insight, the subjective feelings associated with the Aha! experience may not be 
reliable indicators of restructuring. Ash et al. (2009) argued against conflating the 
experience of an Aha! moment with the process of restructuring. Gleaning evidence from 
previous research, they highlighted vulnerabilities implicit when solvers are asked to 
assess their own metacognitive processes. Further, no information processing theory of 
automatic restructuring includes feelings as mechanisms of the insight problem solving 
process. Rather, these Aha! feelings are an epiphenomenon that be explained by the 
theories.  
 However, all automatic restructuring theories denote the importance of impasse in 
activating the restructuring process that must occur in insightful solutions. As such, Ash 
et al. (2012) chose to operationally define the occurrence of insight as solution after 
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impasse. In this study, impasse was empirically assessed using a think-aloud protocol. 
Using both insight problems and arithmetic problems, they found that this method of 
coding the restructuring phase confirmed predictions based on the Gestalt theory of 
insight. They assessed initial problem representation through importance ratings 
administered prior to the solving phase and found that problems solved without impasse 
began with a more appropriate initial problem representation than problems solved with 
impasse, confirming the assumption that insightful solutions begin with a faulty problem 
representation. They also found that problems involving impasse took markedly longer to 
solve than problems solved without impasse. This result supported Gestalt theory, but 
was directly contradicted by Chein and Weisberg's (2013) finding that problems 
involving an Aha! experience were solved much faster than those categorized as 
analytical. Lastly, Ash et al. found that none of these observations were echoed in the 
data from the arithmetic problems indicating a qualitative distinction between analytical 
and insightful problem solving.  
Current Study  
 We propose that conflicting evidence in the literature regarding working memory 
and the insight process is a product of how insightful solutions have been assessed. Ash 
and Wiley (2006) isolated the restructuring phase by manipulating the initial problem 
space, but did not attempt to confirm the occurrence of restructuring. Ricks et al. (2007) 
did not attempt to assess restructuring at all. Fleck (2008) attempted to assess 
restructuring, but chose representational change as the operational definition instead of 
solution after impasse. Gilhooly and Fioratou (2009) relied on previous research to 
differentiate between insightful and analytic problems and did not attempt to confirm the 
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occurrence of restructuring. Chein and Weisberg (2013) attempted to assess restructuring, 
but used a self-report method that has not been validated, finding results that contradicted 
previous research.  
  We also propose that the self-report Aha! rating scale is specifically responsible 
for the contradictory findings that Chein and Weisberg (2013) reported. This scale had 
not been tested for its psychometric soundness and there was no evidence that it 
displayed construct validity or that it was even related to impasse and restructuring. 
Further, we propose that the subjective, self-reported feelings associated with insight are 
a questionable means for coding restructuring. As all theories of insight indicate that 
restructuring occurs after impasse, we argue that empirically coding for impasse is a more 
theoretically valid method of assessing the occurrence of restructuring.  
 The two major goals of this study were to 1) test the validity of the Aha! rating 
scale and 2) to test predictions based on automatic restructuring and Type 2 restructuring 
theories using different operational definitions of insight.  
 To test the validity of the Aha! rating, we separated the scale into the three 
dimensions of insight articulated within the scale's instructions: confidence, suddenness, 
and effort. We further reduced the opportunity for response confusion by anchoring each 
scale with extremes, Not and Very. If the Aha! rating scale possesses strong construct 
validity, we expected that these three ratings would be highly correlated for correctly 
solved problems. If the Aha! rating scale demonstrates convergent validity, we expected 
that these three ratings would be highly correlated with solution after impasse. To further 
confirm convergent validity, we expected that the Aha! ratings would closely mirror 
impasse results for all remaining hypothesis testing.  
16 
 
 All theories of insight assume that insightful solutions begin from an inaccurate 
problem representation. Using initial problem representation ratings, we expected to 
confirm this assumption with all four operational definitions of insight: high confidence, 
high suddenness, low effort, and solution after impasse.  
 Gestalt theory predicts longer solving times for insightful solutions as they require 
the solver to exhaust an inappropriate problem space before entering impasse. Ash et al. 
(2012) provided evidence to support this prediction. Using the Aha! rating scale, Chein 
and Weisberg (2013) found the opposite: that insightful solutions were associated with 
faster solving times than non-insightful solutions. We attempted to replicate these 
findings using the four different definitions of insight. 
 Finally, the Gestalt theory of insightful problem solving proposes that 
restructuring is an automatic process that does not involve attention. This predicts a 
weaker correlation between solution success and working memory for problems solved 
with restructuring than for problems solved without restructuring. The Business-As-Usual 
theory proposes that restructuring involves Type 2 processes that are controlled and 
effortful. This predicts that correlations between working memory and solution success 
should be equally high whether the solution is insightful or not. We assessed these 
predictions by comparing solution success with working memory for all four definitions 
of insight. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
 
 Participants 
 One hundred two Old Dominion University undergraduate psychology students 
volunteered to participate in this study (79.4% women; Mage = 21.15, SD = 5.49, age 
range: 18–53; 93.1% native English speakers; 74.5% had college algebra within five 
years; 28.4% psychology majors; see Tables 1 and 2 for further demographic 
information). A power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to determine the 
necessary sample size of 72 to detect an effect size of .28 with 80% power using a 
bivariate correlation and alpha set at .05. The effect size used in this analysis was based 
on results from Ash and Wiley (2006) and chosen as a more conservative estimate of the 
relationship between working memory and insight problem solving ability than other 
reported effect sizes in the literature. Participants were required to be at least 18 years of 
age and have normal or normal-to-corrected vision. Participants were recruited through 
the Department of Psychology's online research participation system and received one 
and a half research credits for their participation. This study was approved by Old 
Dominion University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) and ethical guidelines set forth 
by the American Psychological Association were followed. All participants signed an 
IRB approved Informed Consent Form that explained their rights as a volunteer 
(Appendix A).  
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Table 1   
Participant Demographic Frequency Data   
        n % 
Sex     
Female  81 79.4 
Male  21 20.6 
Total  102 100.0 
      
English     
English has ALWAYS been my primary language.  95 93.1 
English has been my primary language for MORE than 10 years.  2 2.0 
English has been my primary language for LESS than 10 years.  0 0.0 
English has been my primary language for LESS than 5 years.  2 2.0 
English is NOT my primary language.  3 2.9 
Total  102 100.0 
      
Algebra     
I've had a college level algebra class in the past 5 years.  76 74.5 
I've had a college level algebra class in the past 10 years.  5 4.9 
I've had a college level algebra class more than 10 years ago.  1 1.0 
I've NEVER had a college level algebra class.  20 19.6 
Total  102 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 2   
Participant Major Frequency Data   
 n % 
Accounting  1 1.0 
Biology  10 9.8 
Business Management  1 1.0 
Business Management / Psychology  1 1.0 
Chemistry  1 1.0 
Civil Engineering  1 1.0 
Criminal Justice  8 7.8 
Criminal Justice / Sociology  1 1.0 
Dental Hygiene  4 3.9 
Electrical Engineering Technology  1 1.0 
Engineering  1 1.0 
Exercise Science  6 5.9 
Health Science  1 1.0 
Human Services  5 4.9 
Industrial Technology  2 2.0 
Interdisciplinary Studies  1 1.0 
Marine Biology / Applied Mathematics  1 1.0 
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Table 2 (continued)   
 n % 
Mechanical Engineering  1 1.0 
Nuclear Medicine Technology  1 1.0 
Nursing  14 13.7 
Occupational and Technical Studies Training Specialist  1 1.0 
Parks and Recreation Management  1 1.0 
Parks, Recreation, and Tourism  1 1.0 
Physical Education  1 1.0 
Pre Medical Biology  1 1.0 
Psychology  29 28.4 
Total  102 100.0 
 
 
 
Materials 
 All sections of this study, with the exception of the problem solving phase, were 
administered on a Dell Optiplex 780 computer running Windows Vista with a monitor set 
to a resolution of 1280  1024 pixels. The tasks were programmed using E-Prime 2.0 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2012a, 2012b). During the problem solving 
phase, participants completed the insight problems with paper and pencil while the Aha! 
ratings were administered on the computer.  
 Insight problems. This study used problems selected from Ash and Wiley (2006; 
2008; see Appendix B). These problems have been classified as insight problems in 
previous research because they tend to elicit an incorrect initial problem representation in 
which a final solution cannot be found unless restructuring of the problem occurs. To be 
able to assess initial problem representation, a final criterion in selection was that each 
problem could be broken down into discrete components that were easily coded for 
importance in the final solution.  
 Initial problem representation ratings. Using a method developed by Ash & 
Wiley (2008), we assessed initial problem representation by having participants rate each  
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a) Coins Problem: In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin 
touches exactly 3 other coins. The coins will need to be separated into two groups.  
 
 
b) Coins problem solution. 
 
 
c) Component importance coding.  
 
 
Figure 2. The coins problem, its solution, and how key and distractor components (each 
coin) are coded for importance in the final solution. Participants are asked to rate the 
importance of each coin on a scale of (1) Not Important to (7) Very Important. Scores for 
the key components are averaged together and scores for the distractor components are 
reverse coded, then averaged together. A final representation score is created by 
averaging these two scores together.  
 
 
 
component of the insight problems for their importance in finding the solution. For 
example, the insight problem illustrated in Figure 2 shows a collection of coins with the 
instructions, In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin touches 
exactly 3 other coins. The coins will need to be separated into two groups. In this 
problem, there are only two coins that can be moved to create the final, correct solution. 
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These two coins are key components and are coded as being used in the solution (1), 
while all other coins are distractor components and are coded as not being used in the 
solution (0). Participants were presented with an image of the problem with the 
component they were rating colored red. They were asked to rate How important will the 
coin in red be in finding the solution? on a scale of (1) Not Important to (7) Very 
Important.  
 Before entering the rating phase, they were instructed to give immediate 
impressions and to quickly rate each component without attempting to solve. To 
accommodate for the varying number of components in each problem, a weighted mean 
was used to create a final representation rating. Ratings for key components were 
averaged together and ratings for distractor components were reverse coded, then 
averaged together. These two scores were averaged together to create an overall initial 
problem representation rating in which higher scores indicated better initial problem 
representation.  
 Aha! ratings. To investigate the subjective feelings associated with insight 
problem solving, participants were asked to rate their problem solving experience on 
three dimensions: confidence, suddenness, and effort. Ratings were made on a 4-point 
scale upon completion of each problem. Participants were asked, How confident are you 
in your solution?, anchored at (1) Not Confident and (4) Very Confident; How sudden did 
the solution come to you?, anchored at (1) Not Sudden and (4) Very Sudden; and How 
much effort was required to find the solution?, anchored at (1) Not Effortful and (4) Very 
Effortful. Instructions for these ratings included detailed descriptions for each dimension 
(Appendix C). To replicate the dichotomous insight coding used by Chein and Weisberg 
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(2013), scores of one or two were collapsed into a single non-insightful category and 
scores of three or four were similarly collapsed as insightful for both confidence and 
suddenness ratings. Effort was reverse coded as non-insightful for scores of three or four 
and insightful for scores of one or two. 
 Impasse coding and think-aloud protocol. In this study, we empirically 
assessed impasse utilizing a think-aloud protocol. During the problem solving phase, 
participants were asked to continuously describe their mental processes. The think-aloud 
protocol for this phase was video recorded for later data coding. Before beginning the 
problem solving phase, the experimenter read the following:  
Using the packet provided, you will have four minutes to solve each 
problem. There is one problem per page. You must show ALL YOUR 
WORK for each problem and CIRCLE the final answer. You may explain 
your solution in writing, arrows, or other diagrams as necessary as long as 
the solution is clear. ALL problems have a solution and answers such as 
"impossible" or "not solvable" will be counted as incorrect. So that we can 
understand what you are doing while you solve each problem, you will 
talk through your problem solving process out loud. This section will be 
video recorded for later data coding.  
 This ‘think aloud’ process should be like a stream of 
consciousness: whatever is going on in your mind is what you should 
verbalize. If you are reading the problem, read it out loud. If you are 
writing on the paper, verbalize what you are doing. Verbalize anything 
you are thinking and be sure to keep talking through the entire process. 
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You will not be given any feedback regarding how close you are to 
solution or the accuracy of your solution, but you will be reminded to keep 
talking if you stop verbalizing during the process. Please remember to 
speak loud enough for the video recording.  
 After completing each problem, you will be asked three rating 
questions (on the computer) that describe your problem solving process. 
You will enter your response by using the mouse to click on your choice. 
After completing the rating questions, you will wait for the experimenter 
before continuing to solve the next problem.  
 We will now do a practice problem so you can get used to the think 
aloud protocol and see how the rating questions work. When you are ready 
to begin, you will turn the practice page over and read the instructions out 
loud. After you read the instructions, I will ask if you are ready to begin. I 
will then begin the four minute timer. When you have the solution, RAISE 
YOUR HAND and I will stop the timer. You will then answer the rating 
questions on the computer using the mouse. REMEMBER TO KEEP 
THINKING OUT LOUD. Do you have any questions? 
 The videos were later coded by four independent raters looking for the occurrence 
of impasse. Following the impasse coding procedure outlined in Ash et al. (2012), the 
operational definition of impasse was taken from Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, and 
Rhenius (1999) who define impasse as the "cessation of overt problem-solving behavior" 
which is "accompanied by a subjective feeling of not knowing what to do" (p. 1534). 
Raters looked for instances that supported this definition: periods of silence, especially 
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Table 3     
Inter-rater Reliability for Impasse Coding     
 Cohen's 
kappa 
 
  95% CI 
 SE p Lower Upper 
Coder 1 x Coder 2 .82 0.07 < .001 .68 .95 
Coder 1 x Coder 3 .84 0.06 < .001 .71 .96 
Coder 1 x Coder 4 .84 0.06 < .001 .72 .96 
Coder 2 x Coder 3 .80 0.07 < .001 .66 .94 
Coder 2 x Coder 4 .76 0.08 < .001 .61 .91 
Coder 3 x Coder 4 .78 0.07 < .001 .63 .92 
Note. n = 93. 
 
 
 
after reminders to continue the verbal protocol, verbal indications of impasse such as "I 
don't know what to do" or "I'm lost", physical stillness in which the participant ceased to 
actively write or point to the problem, verbal expressions of frustration or frustrated body 
language, and mindless repetition of the instructions. All raters reviewed a subset of 93 
problems in which Cohen's kappa was used to assess agreement between raters. Using 
Altman's (1991) standards of agreement, agreement between raters ranged from good,     
κ = .76, p = < .001, 95% CI [.61, .91], to very good, κ = .84, p = < .001, 95% CI [.72, .96] 
(Table 3).  
 Video for the think-aloud protocol was captured with a Panasonic PV-GS150 
digital video camcorder on a Macintosh computer running Mac OS X using SecuritySpy 
software. The tripod mounted camcorder was positioned approximately four and a half 
feet in front of the seated participant (Figure 3).  
 Working memory tasks. Working memory capacity was measured using 
replications of Kane et al.'s (2004) reading span task (RSPAN) and operation span task 
(OSPAN). These are dual-process tasks that require participants to maintain information 
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Figure 3. Laboratory set-up for this experiment. Participants were seated at the computer 
to the left and the experimenter was seated at the computer to the right. The camera was 
positioned approximately four and a half feet in front of the participant.  
 
 
 
while concurrently executing a secondary task. Working memory capacity is then 
assessed by performance on information recall. For analysis, a single working memory 
score was created by averaging the standardized composite scores from both the RSPAN 
and OSPAN.  
 Reading span task. The RSPAN task requires participants to retain, then later 
recall a set of letters from their short-term memory. While attempting to retain these 
letters, a secondary reading comprehension task must be completed. In this task, 
participants are presented with a sentence that they must read aloud. All sentences are 
grammatically correct, but in half of the sentences a noun has been replaced with an 
irrelevant noun rendering the sentence nonsensical. The participant must state whether 
the sentence makes sense or not by indicating "yes" or "no". The sentences are followed 
by a letter that the participant must read aloud and attempt to retain. For example, if the 
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participant is presented with the following, Andy was stopped by the policeman because 
he crossed the yellow heaven.  ?  R, they should say: “Andy was stopped by the 
policeman because he crossed the yellow heaven... no… r.” After the participant reads 
the letter aloud, the experimenter immediately advances to the next stimulus screen. After 
a certain number of these sentences and letters, the participant is cued to write down all 
the letters they can recall from that particular set in the order they occurred. The sets 
range from two to five letters and each set size is repeated three times with new stimuli 
for a total of 12 sets (see Appendix D for complete stimuli list). Each recalled set is 
graded on the total number of letters recalled divided by the total number of letters 
presented in that set. This is an all or nothing grading in which credit is only given if all 
letters in the set are reproduced in the correct order. A final composite RSPAN score is 
created by summing the weighted set scores. 
 Operation span task. The OSPAN task follows the same procedure as the 
RSPAN with two differences: the primary memory task asks participants to recall a set of 
words instead of letters and the secondary task has been replaced with a simple arithmetic 
equation and solution in which the participant must decide if the solution presented is 
correct (e.g., IS (9 ÷ 3) + 2 = 2  ?  AUNT; see Appendix E for complete stimuli list). 
 Reliability and validity. Both working memory tasks have been adapted from 
Engle et al. (1999) in which short term memory tasks, working memory tasks, general 
fluid intelligence, and both the verbal and math portions of the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT) were examined for divergent and convergent construct relationships. Using factor 
analysis and structural equation modeling, their results supported that these are distinct, 
though related constructs. Also using structural equation modeling techniques, Kane et al. 
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(2004) investigated the relationship between verbal working memory tasks (RSPAN and 
OPSAN) and spatial working memory tasks. They found that the two categories share 
70%–80% of their variance indicating that working memory tasks, regardless of domain 
specification, largely measure a domain-general construct. They further reported that the 
RSPAN and OSPAN have good reliability with Cronbach's alphas of .78 and .80 
respectively. In this study, the RSPAN and OSPAN together were found to be reliable, 
producing a Cronbach's alpha of .84. 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited via the Psychology Department's online research 
participation system. They attended their individual, one and a half hour session at a 
laboratory located on the campus of Old Dominion University. Upon arrival, they were 
seated at a computer station and given time to read and sign the Informed Consent Form. 
After the participants signed the form, they proceeded through the experimental phases 
(Figure 4). A balanced Latin square approach was used to produce six order conditions 
for the insight problems. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six order  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment procedural flow. A balanced Latin square approach was used to 
produce six order conditions for the insight problems. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the six order conditions. This order condition was maintained for the 
initial problem representation phase as well as for the problem solving phase. During the 
problem solving phase, each insight problem was followed by three Aha! ratings. 
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conditions. This order condition was maintained for the initial problem representation 
phase as well as for the problem solving phase. All directions were read aloud by the 
experimenter, but were also represented on the computer screen so that the participant 
could read along with them. Each section contained a practice phase.  
 Participants began with the initial problem representation phase in which each 
insight problem was presented and the participant was asked about their familiarity with 
the problem as well as to rate the importance of the problem components. They then 
completed the working memory phase, first the RSPAN and then the OSPAN, and 
continued with the problem-solving phase and think-aloud protocol. After completion of 
each insight problem, the participant gave their Aha! ratings on the computer before 
continuing to the next problem. Following the problem solving phase, participants took 
the Cognitive Reflection Test. This section was a pilot test for future research and will 
not be discussed at this time. At the conclusion of the experiment, the participant was 
debriefed, allowed to ask questions, and asked to refrain from discussing the experiment 
with others in the research pool.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Data Screening 
 Thirteen participants were removed from all analyses for a final sample size of 89. 
Of these 13, six participants did not finish the experiment and were removed due to 
incomplete data. We reduced the potential for confounded results caused by language 
difficulties by removing seven participants who indicated that English was not their 
primary language (including two previously mentioned as missing data). Using criteria 
set forth by Engle et al. (1999), participants must have maintained at least 85% accuracy 
on the secondary working memory tasks to be retained for analyses. This reduces the 
potential for biased or inaccurate working memory scores (e.g., participants who are 
attempting to employ rehearsal or other mnemonic strategies to improve their recall 
performance or participants who may have language difficulties). Five participants failed 
to meet this minimum requirement (including three previously mentioned for removal 
due to missing data or language).  
Overall Analysis Strategy 
 Not all solvers experience insight while completing classic insight problems. To 
this end, it is necessary to analyze the data at the level of observation. This allows for 
participants with differential insight and solution rates to contribute to the different 
categories of observation, e.g., solution success, impasse, and confidence. To 
accommodate the differing number of observations that a single participant can 
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contribute, information from each of the six insight problems were considered as 
individual data points and analyzed at the level of observation where indicated. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for mean initial representation scores by 
problem and by participant, working memory span, number of correctly solved problems, 
and mean solving time for correctly solved problems. Table 5 presents the solution rates 
for the insight problems. Solution rates were lower than expected based on previous data 
from Ash and Wiley (2006) and Ash et al. (2012). From a total of 534 problems, there 
was a 24.2% success rate, while 22.3% of problems were completed with incorrect 
solutions and 53.6% were left unsolved. Of correctly solved problems, the circles 
problem garnered the highest solution rate (27.1%), whereas the coins problem had the 
lowest solution rate (3.1%). Table 6 presents the frequency data for the four measures of 
insight. Of note is the low variability within confidence for correctly solved problems.  
 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Measures 
    95% CI   
 N M SD Lower Upper Skew Kurtosis 
Initial Problem    
  Representation 
Scores 
       
      By Problem 534 4.27 1.13 4.17 4.36 0.33 0.24 
      By Participant 89 4.27 0.49 4.16 4.37 0.44 0.83 
Working Memory 
Span 
89 0.00
a
 0.93 -0.20 0.20 0.25 -0.01 
Total Correctly 
Solved 
89 1.45 1.22 1.19 1.71 0.82 0.62 
Mean Solving Time
b
  67
c
 123.57 63.16 108.17 138.98 0.24 -1.14 
Note. N = 534; a = working memory span scores were standardized; b = for correctly 
solved problems; c = twenty-two participants (24.7%) did not solve any problems. 
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Table 5    
Solution Rates By Problem Type    
 Correct Incorrect Did Not Solve 
All Problems, N = 534       
Matchsticks #1  17 3.2%  21 3.9%  51 9.6% 
Matchsticks #2  22 4.1%  8 1.5%  59 11.0% 
Glasses  32 6.0%  24 4.5%  33 6.2% 
Circles  35 6.6%  16 3.0%  38 7.1% 
Coins  4 0.7%  40 7.5%  45 8.4% 
Squares  19 3.6%  10 1.9%  60 11.2% 
Total  129 24.2%  119 22.3%  286 53.6% 
       
Correctly Solved Problems, N = 129       
Matchsticks #1  17 13.2%     
Matchsticks #2  22 17.1%     
Glasses  32 24.8%     
Circles  35 27.1%     
Coins  4 3.1%     
Squares  19 14.7%     
Total  129 100.0%     
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Frequency Data for Measures of Insight 
 Solved  Solved   
 with Insight without 
Insight 
DNS/Incorrect 
All Problems, N = 534       
    Confidence 107 20.0% 22  4.1% 405 75.8% 
    Suddenness 68 12.7% 61 11.4% 405 75.8% 
    Effort 60 11.2% 69 12.9% 405 75.8% 
    Impasse 80 15.0% 49 9.2% 405 75.8% 
Correctly Solved Problems, N = 
129 
      
    Confidence 107 82.9% 22 17.1%   
    Suddenness 68 52.7% 61 47.3%   
    Effort 60 46.5% 69 53.5%   
    Impasse 80 62.0% 49 38.0%   
Note. DNS = did not solve. 
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Participants felt confident about their solutions 82.9% of the time for correctly solved 
problems.  
Relationships Between Measures of Insight  
 Self-report ratings of the Aha! experience used in previous research have been 
presented on a single continuum scale that encompasses several dimensions: confidence, 
suddenness, and effort. Within the context of this scale, the occurrence of an insightful 
solution is operationalized as the solver being highly confident in their solution (high 
confidence), that the solution seemed to come suddenly (high suddenness), and that little 
effort was necessary to obtain the solution (low effort). As such, it is expected that 
parsing these dimensions into three unique ratings would produce strong levels of 
agreement when sorting problems solved with insight and without. Further, if self-report 
Aha! ratings are truly reflective of post-impasse restructuring, it is expected that they 
would strongly relate to solutions categorized by the Gestalt defined occurrence of 
insight, solution after impasse. To examine these relationships, a series of chi square tests 
of independence were performed at the level of observation on correctly solved problems 
(N = 129; see Tables 7-12 for frequency data). Chi square goodness of fit tests were then 
used to isolate differences within significant relationships.  
 
 
 
Table 7 
Observed Frequencies for Confidence  Suddenness 
 Suddenness  
 High (Insight) Low (No Insight) Total 
Confidence    
    High (Insight)  61  (47.3%)  46  (35.7%)  107  (82.9%) 
    Low (No Insight)  7  (5.4%)  15  (11.6%)  22  (17.1%) 
    Total  68  (52.7%)  61  (47.3%)  129  (100.0%) 
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Table 8 
Observed Frequencies for Suddenness  Effort 
 Effort  
 Low (Insight) High (No Insight) Total 
Suddenness    
    High (Insight)  41  (31.8%)  27  (20.9%)  68  (52.7%) 
    Low (No Insight)  19  (14.7%)  42  (32.6%)  61  (47.3%) 
    Total  60  (46.5%)  69  (53.5%)  129  (100.0%) 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Observed Frequencies for Effort  Confidence 
 Confidence  
 High (Insight) Low (No Insight) Total 
Effort    
    Low (Insight)  53  (41.1%)  7  (5.4%)  60  (46.5%) 
    High (No Insight)  54  (41.9%)  15  (11.6%)  69  (53.5%) 
    Total  107  (82.9%)  22  (17.1%)  129  (100.0%) 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Confidence 
 Confidence  
 High (Insight) Low (No Insight) Total 
Impasse    
    Yes (Insight)  64  (49.6%)  16  (12.4%)  80  (62.0%) 
    No (No Insight)  43  (33.3%)  6  (4.7%)  49  (38.0%) 
    Total  107  (82.9%)  22  (17.1%)  129  (100.0%) 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Suddenness 
 Suddenness  
 High (Insight) Low (No Insight) Total 
Impasse    
    Yes (Insight)  30  (23.3%)  50  (38.8%)  80  (62.0%) 
    No (No Insight)  38  (29.5%)  11  (8.5%)  49  (38.0%) 
    Total  68  (52.7%)  61  (47.3%)  129  (100.0%) 
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Table 12 
Observed Frequencies for Impasse  Effort 
 Effort  
 Low (Insight) High (No Insight) Total 
Impasse    
    Yes (Insight)  22  (17.1%)  58  (45.0%)  80  (62.0%) 
    No (No Insight)  38  (29.5%)  11  (8.5%)  49  (38.0%) 
    Total  60  (46.5%)  69  (53.5%)  129 (100.0%) 
 
 
 
 Confidence  Suddenness. The data revealed a significant relationship between 
confidence and suddenness, 2(1, N = 129) = 4.65, p = .031, φ = .19. However, follow up 
analyses showed that this relationship was not diagnostic of the occurrence of insight 
(Figure 5). Though participants who believed their answer came to them suddenly were 
likely to feel very confident about their solution, 2(1, n = 68) = 42.88, p = < .001, 
participants who did not experience feelings of suddenness were still very confident in 
their responses, 2(1, n = 61) = 15.75, p = < .001. Participants who were highly confident 
in their solution, 2(1, n = 107) = 2.10, p = .147, or had little confidence in their solution, 
2(1, n = 22) = 2.91, p = .088, showed no differences between feelings of suddenness. 
These results suggest that the significant relationship between confidence and suddenness 
is driven by a general level of confidence in all solutions and is not related to solution 
suddenness.  
 Suddenness  Effort. There was a significant relationship between suddenness 
and effort, 2(1, N = 129) = 10.98, p = .001, φ = .29 (Figure 6). Participants who felt their 
solution came to them suddenly showed no differences between feelings of effort,      
2(1, n = 68) = 2.88, p = .090, but participants who did not feel their solution was sudden 
reported significantly more effort was involved, 2(1, n = 61) = 8.67, p = .003.  
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Figure 5. Relationship between confidence and suddenness for correctly solved 
problems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between suddenness and effort for correctly solved problems. 
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Figure 7. Relationship between effort and confidence for correctly solved problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Relationship between impasse and confidence for correctly solved problems.  
 
  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
High (Insight) Low (No Insight) 
Confidence 
C
o
rr
ec
tl
y 
So
lv
ed
 P
ro
b
le
m
s 
Effort Low (Insight) 
Effort High (No Insight) 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
High (Insight) Low (No Insight) 
Confidence 
C
o
rr
ec
tl
y 
So
lv
ed
 P
ro
b
le
m
s 
Impasse Yes (Insight) 
Impasse No (No Insight) 
37 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Relationship between impasse and suddenness for correctly solved problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Relationship between impasse and effort for correctly solved problems.  
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Feelings of little effort were more often accompanied by feelings of suddenness,        
2(1, n = 60) 8.07, p = .005. However, high effort was not significantly associated with 
suddenness, 2(1, n = 69) = 3.26, p = .071. Though weakly associated, these constructs 
did show evidence of validity when assessing Aha! experiences. 
 Effort  Confidence. There was no significant relationship between effort and 
confidence, 2(1, N = 129) = 2.30, p = .129, φ = .13. As Figure 7 illustrates, these 
constructs are unrelated aspects of the Aha! experience. 
 Impasse  Confidence. The data revealed no significant relationship between 
impasse and confidence, 2(1, N = 129) = 1.29, p = .256, φ = .10 (Figure 8), indicating 
that solvers were confident in their solutions regardless of whether they came to impasse.  
 Impasse  Suddenness. As suddenness and effort appear to be the only related 
constructs within the Aha! rating scale, it is of particular interest how they relate to 
problems solved with and without impasse. The relationship between impasse and 
suddenness was significant, 2(1, N = 129) = 19.56, p = < .001, φ = .39, but follow up 
analyses revealed an interesting pattern to the data (Figure 9). Participants who came to 
impasse were less likely to indicate that their solution was sudden, 2(1, n = 80) 5.00,      
p = .025. Participants who did not come to impasse reported high feelings of suddenness, 
2(1, n = 49) = 14.88, p = < .001. There were no significant differences between coming 
to impasse in solutions rated as sudden, 2(1, n = 68) = 0.94, p = .332. However, 
participants who did not feel that their solution was sudden were very likely to experience 
impasse, 2(1, n = 61) 24.93, p = < .001. This data pattern illustrates the opposite 
relationship expected if the Aha! rating correlated with the Gestalt concept of 
restructuring.  
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 Impasse  Effort. A similar and even stronger pattern emerged from the 
significant relationship between impasse and effort, 2(1, N = 129) = 30.60, p = < .001,   
φ = .49. Participants who came to impasse were more likely to rate their solutions as very 
effortful, 2(1, n = 80) 16.20, p = < .001, whereas participants who did not experience 
impasse were more likely to feel that their response was not effortful, 2(1, n = 49) 14.88, 
p = < .001. Participants who did not feel their solution took a lot of effort were less likely 
to experience impasse, 2(1, n = 60) 4.27, p = .039. Participants who felt their solution 
was effortful were very likely to have experienced impasse, 2(1, n = 69) 32.01,               
p = < .001. This relationship is the opposite of what is expected if impasse and effort are 
convergent measures of insightful problem solving (Figure 10). 
 In summary, the first goal of these analyses was to determine whether the three 
constructs inherent in previously used self-report Aha! rating scales showed evidence of 
construct validity when separated into three distinct ratings. Our findings illustrate that 
these three constructs are not strongly related when assessing the occurrence of insight. 
Only the constructs of suddenness and effort appeared to be associated.  
 The second goal of these analyses was to determine the relationships between the 
self-report Aha! ratings and solution after impasse, an operational definition designed to 
reflect the Gestalt view of restructuring. Though suddenness and effort appear to be 
related constructs when assessing insight, they are both inversely related to solution after 
impasse, a pattern that is opposite of predications based on any theory of insight which 
acknowledges that restructuring occurs in solutions attained after impasse. Therefore, 
previous studies utilizing the Aha! rating scale have inappropriately categorized some 
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solutions obtained without impasse as insightful experiences based on feelings of 
suddenness and low effort.  
Insight and Initial Problem Representation 
 Integral to the Gestalt theory of insight is the idea that the process to an insightful 
solution begins with an inaccurate problem representation. This assumption was explored 
by examining the relationships between initial problem representation and the four 
different methods of operationalizing insight (high suddenness, high confidence, low 
effort, or solution after impasse). This was an exploratory investigation for the three self-
report measures and an attempt to replicate results from Ash et al. (2012) for impasse. To 
do this, a series of mixed model analyses of variances, which compared insightful 
solutions, solutions made without insight, and problems that were not solved or had 
incorrect solutions, were performed on mean initial representation scores at the level of 
observation (N = 534; see Table 13 for descriptive statistics). In these analyses, 
participant was included as a random effect variable. Results did not reveal differences in 
initial problem representation and whether the problem solving process was experienced 
as insightful for the three self-report measures: confidence, F(2, 98.93) = 0.20, p = .817, 
partial η2 = .004, suddenness, F(2, 99.02) = 0.99, p = .376, partial η2 = .02, and effort, 
F(2, 98.68) = 1.88, p = .159, partial η2 = .04. Only impasse produced significant 
differences, F(2, 105.28) = 4.29, p = .016, partial η2 = .08 . Participants who correctly 
solved problems without experiencing impasse were more likely to begin with a better 
initial problem representation (M = 4.94, SE = 0.18) than solvers who came to impasse 
(M = 4.11, SE = 0.13), F(1, 20.29) = 6.51, p = .019, partial η2 = .24. This supports the  
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Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for Initial Representation Ratings as a Function of Insight 
   95% CI 
 n  M SE Lower Upper 
Confidence      
    High (Insight)  107 4.32 0.12 4.09 4.56 
    Low (No Insight)  22 4.48 0.24 4.02 4.95 
    Did Not Solve/Incorrect  405 4.25 0.06 4.13 4.36 
Suddenness      
    High (Insight)  68 4.61 0.15 4.32 4.91 
    Low (No Insight)  61 4.20 0.15 3.90 4.50 
    Did Not Solve/Incorrect  405 4.25 0.06 4.13 4.36 
Effort      
    Low (Insight)  60 4.67 0.16 4.36 4.97 
    High (No Insight)  69 4.14 0.14 3.87 4.41 
    Did Not Solve/Incorrect  405 4.25 0.06 4.13 4.36 
Impasse      
    Yes (Insight)  80 4.11 0.13 3.86 4.37 
    No (No Insight)  49 4.94 0.18 4.59 5.28 
    Did Not Solve/Incorrect  405 4.25 0.06 4.13 4.36 
Note. N = 534.  
 
     
 
 
Gestalt theory of insightful problems solving and replicated findings from Ash et al. 
(2012). 
 These results challenge the appropriateness of using the self-report Aha! ratings 
as operational definitions of insight. If they captured the Gestalt concept of restructuring, 
we would expect the patterns of data to mirror that of the impasse data. Though not 
significant, Figure 11 illustrates that both suddenness and effort actually appear to have 
the opposite pattern from what is expected: insightful experiences, i.e., problems rated 
with high suddenness and low effort began from a better initial problem representation. 
This is directly at odds with the assumption that insightful problem solving must begin 
with an inaccurate problem representation.  
  
42 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean initial representation rating scores as a function of insight in confidence, 
suddenness, effort, and impasse. Note that asterisks indicate significant differences.  
 
 
 
Insight and Solving Time  
 Two specific studies found contradictory evidence regarding solution speed for 
problems solved with insight. Ash et al. (2012) demonstrated that solutions obtained after 
impasse came significantly slower than non-insightful solutions. Chein and Weisberg 
(2013) found that insightful solutions were produced much quicker than non-insightful 
solutions. One primary difference between these two studies was the operational 
definition of insight. Ash et al. defined insight as solution after impasse coded by 
impartial raters, while Chein and Weisberg utilized the self-report Aha! rating scale. The 
current study allowed us to compare solving times using both methodologies within the 
same problem set.  
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 A series of mixed model analyses of variances (problems solved with insight 
versus problems solved without insight), in which participant was included as a random 
effect variable, were performed on mean solving times at the level of observation for 
correctly solved problems (N = 129; see Table 14 for descriptive statistics). No 
relationship was detected between confidence and solving time, F(1, 10.22) = 0.13,         
p = .731, partial η2 = .01. Using suddenness as an indicator of insight revealed a trend 
towards significance, F(1, 14.51) = 3.72, p = .073, partial η2 = .20, with solutions rated as 
sudden associated with faster solving times (M = 97.63, SE = 7.28) than solutions rated as 
not very sudden (M = 149.65, SE = 7.38). The same effect was observed when effort was 
used as the indicator for insight, F(1, 17.66) = 27.78, p = < .001, partial η2 = .61. Low 
effort solutions were significantly faster (M = 69.60, SE = 6.25) than high effort solutions 
(M = 154.88, SE = 5.55). Overall, this replicated Chein and Weisberg's results who found  
 
 
 
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics for Solving Time as a Function of Insight 
    95% CI 
      n  M SE Lower Upper 
Confidence      
    High (Insight)  107 122.33 6.36 109.56 135.10 
    Low (No Insight)  22 126.48 12.58 101.22 151.74 
Suddenness      
    High (Insight)  68 97.63 7.28 82.99 112.27 
    Low (No Insight)  61 149.65 7.38 134.81 164.49 
Effort      
    Low (Insight)  60 69.60 6.25 57.00 82.20 
    High (No Insight)  69 154.88 5.55 143.70 166.06 
Impasse      
    Yes (Insight)  80 154.32 5.84 142.53 166.12 
    No (No Insight)  49 48.99 7.87 33.11 64.87 
Note. N = 534.  
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Figure 12. Mean solving time as a function of insight for correctly solved problems in 
confidence, suddenness, effort, and impasse. Asterisks indicate significant differences.  
 
 
 
that problems reported as insightful, i.e., high confidence, high suddenness, and low 
effort, were solved faster than problems reported with low Aha! ratings. However, when 
insight was operationalized as problems solved after impasse, the opposite pattern was 
found, F(1, 20.49) = 36.79, p = < .001, partial η2 = .64. Solutions after impasse were 
associated with significantly slower solving times (M = 154.32, SE = 5.84) than problems 
solved without impasse (M = 48.99, SE = 7.87), a replication of Ash et al. (2012). As 
Figure 12 illustrates, these analyses clearly demonstrate that the contradictory results 
from previous literature regarding solving time and insight are a function of how insight 
was operationally defined.  
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Insight and Working Memory 
 Working memory has been a prominent feature in research investigating the 
insight problem solving process, being used to support both the Gestalt and the Business-
As-Usual theories of insight. We continued this line of research by comparing the four 
measures of insight with working memory. These analyses were conducted at the 
participant level (N = 89). Consistent with previous research, overall problem solving 
ability was significantly related to working memory, r(87) = .213, p = .045. We 
replicated procedures used in Chein and Weisberg (2013) and created two sets of 
proportions for each definition of insight: 1) number of problems solved with insight over 
total number of problems; 2) number of problems solved without insight over total 
number of problems; 3) number of problems solved with insight over total number of 
problems less problems solved without insight; and 4) number of problems solved 
without insight over the total number of problems less problems solved with insight (see 
Table 15 for descriptive statistics). The last two proportions were included as more 
precise measures of individual differences in success at insightful or non-insightful 
problem solving. After calculating these proportions for each of the four operational 
definitions of insight—high confidence, high suddenness, low effort, and impasse after 
solution—we then correlated these proportions with working memory scores. The two 
different methods for calculating the proportions did not produce major differences 
between the correlations with working memory (Table 16). Therefore, we discuss the 
results in terms of the proportions calculated using the total number of problems.  
 For the self-report ratings assessed as insightful, the proportions of problems  
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Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Proportions of Problems Solved 
  95% CI   
 M SD Lower Upper Skew Kurt 
       
Proportion Solved / Total # Problems 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.82 0.62 
 
      
Confidence       
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.20 0.21 0.16 0.24 1.16 1.21 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.04 0.08 0.02 0.06 1.79 2.45 
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less No Insight 
0.20 0.21 0.16 0.24 1.15 1.18 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less Insight 
0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07 1.79 2.37 
Suddenness       
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.13 0.18 0.09 0.17 1.72 3.04 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.11 0.15 0.08 0.15 1.27 1.38 
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less No Insight 
0.13 0.18 0.09 0.17 1.72 3.03 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less Insight 
0.13 0.16 0.09 0.16 1.09 0.36 
Effort       
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.11 0.17 0.08 0.15 1.74 2.72 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.13 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.82 0.01 
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less No Insight 
0.11 0.18 0.08 0.15 1.75 2.79 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less Insight 
0.15 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.70 -0.53 
Impasse       
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.15 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.74 -0.10 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems 
0.09 0.16 0.06 0.13 2.46 6.71 
Proportion Solved with Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less No Insight 
0.15 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.70 -0.17 
Proportion Solved with No Insight /  
   Total # Problems Less Insight 
0.11 0.19 0.07 0.14 2.32 5.72 
Note. N = 89.       
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solved with high confidence were significantly correlated with working memory,        
r(87) = .254, p = .016. High suddenness, r(87) = .203, p = .056, and low effort,          
r(87) = .198, p = .063, also showed the same positive relationships with working 
memory. No significant relationships were found between working memory and the 
proportions of problems solved without insight, i.e., low confidence, low suddenness, and 
high effort. Overall, this replicated results reported by Chein and Weisberg (2013) which 
were interpreted as evidence that Type 2 processes are involved with restructuring. 
 However, when insight was operationalized as solution after impasse, there was 
no evidence of a relationship between the proportion of problems solved with insight and 
working memory, r(87) = .050, p = .644. Further, the proportion of problems solved 
without impasse was significantly related to working memory, r(87) = .220, p = .038. 
This replicates previous research that has shown no relationship between working 
memory and restructuring in insightful problem solving (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Fleck, 
2008; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). Therefore, when insight is operationally defined as 
solution after impasse, our results match predictions made by automatic restructuring 
theories. However, when insight is operationally defined in terms of self-report Aha! 
experiences, we find evidence predicted by the Business-As-Usual theory of insight.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  Many studies have used a self-report Aha! rating scale to determine the 
occurrence of insight (e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Chein & Weisberg, 2013; 
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). In this study, we investigated whether this was a valid way to 
assess insightful problem solving experiences. The anchors of this scale—strategic and 
insight, constructs that are not extremes on the same continuum—are described in terms 
of solution confidence, how sudden a solution manifests, and the effort required during 
the solving process. Of concern is that these multi-barreled instructions create the 
potential for response confusion. Our data clearly suggests that this is the case. 
Separating this scale into its three unique subcomponents reveals little in the way to 
support construct validity. Confidence is not related to either suddenness or effort and 
although suddenness and effort do appear to be related, it is a weaker association that 
does not justify their combination into a single measurement. When presenting these 
three fairly independent constructs as a single scale, participants must choose their 
response given which element is most salient to them at the time, inadvertently creating 
what is essentially three different dependent variables.  
 Our data further demonstrate that the Aha! rating scale is wholly unrelated to the 
Gestalt defined concept of restructuring, the key to all investigations regarding the insight 
problem solving process. The Gestalt theory of insight is based on the assumptions that 
insightful solutions begin from an inaccurate initial problem representation and that 
restructuring, the process of overcoming this faulty problem space and formulating the 
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correct problem representation, occurs only after a period of impasse. When operationally 
defining insight based on the criteria of solution after impasse, we found no evidence of 
convergent validity with any of the self-report definitions of insight: high confidence, 
high suddenness, or low effort. Confidence was unrelated to impasse after solution. High 
suddenness and low effort were actually associated with solutions obtained without 
impasse.  
 We also found that participants solving after impasse began with a less 
appropriate initial problem representation than those who solved without impasse, a 
pattern predicted by Gestalt theory. However, the three self-report ratings were not 
significantly associated with initial problem representation. This anomalous pattern was 
repeated when assessing solving time. Solutions after impasse were significantly 
associated with slower solving times, a result that is predicted by Gestalt theory. If a 
solver must exhaust a faulty problem representation before coming to impasse, it stands 
to reason that it would take longer to acquire a solution than if the solver began with an 
accurate problem representation. Of the self-report ratings, confidence was unrelated to 
solving time and suddenness and effort were, again, predictive of the opposite pattern 
than expected: solutions rated with high suddenness and low effort were produced at a 
faster rate.  
 In total, the data present no evidence that the self-report Aha! ratings are at all 
appropriate in assessing Gestalt defined restructuring. Further, our results indicate that 
participants interpreted suddenness and effort as reflecting solutions that came quickly 
and easily, i.e., did not involve impasse and started from a more accurate problem 
representation. This suggests that previous studies using the Aha! rating scale have, at 
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least in part, erroneously classified solutions as insightful with no instance of impasse or 
restructuring. This has resulted in data patterns that may be contrary to what is expected 
from the Gestalt view of insightful problem solving, explaining some of the discrepancies 
found in the literature.  
 Our final set of analyses corroborates previous research supporting competing 
theories of insightful problem solving, providing further evidence that different 
operational definitions of insight are driving contradictory findings. Analyzing the 
relationship between insight and working memory, we demonstrated that assessing 
insight with the Aha! ratings resulted in support for the Business-As-Usual theory, while 
assessing insight as solution after impasse supported the Gestalt theory of insight. These 
differences can be attributed to the miscategorization of quick and easy solutions as 
involving restructuring, when they actually were neither misrepresented nor involved the 
occurrence of impasse.  
 Our results clearly illustrate that the self-report Aha! rating scale lacks validity. 
The profound implication of this statement is that over a decade of research using this 
scale as the sole means of assessing restructuring has produced questionable results. 
Further, our data imply that the feelings traditionally associated with an Aha! experience 
are not necessarily indicative of the underlying processes. Many researchers have 
overemphasized the importance of these feelings and presented the Aha! experience as 
synonymous with restructuring with little evidence that these constructs are reliably 
related (see Ash et al., 2009, for review of this issue). While our results indicated that the 
subjective Aha! experience is not an appropriate method for assessing restructuring, they 
clearly support that focusing on how a person overcomes impasse is. By this definition, 
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our work consistently demonstrated support for the Gestalt theory that restructuring is a 
component specific to the insight problem solving process with the deeper implication 
that modern information processing theories grounded in this view accurately assume that 
this process is largely automatic.  
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Working Memory and Problem Solving 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your decision whether to say 
YES or NO to participation in this research, and to record the consent of those who say YES to 
participation in this study. 
 
RESEARCHERS 
Responsible Project Investigator: Investigator: 
 Ivan K. Ash, Ph.D.  Kimberly D. Lee 
 Assistant Professor  Master's Candidate 
 College of Sciences   College of Sciences 
 Department of Psychology  Department of Psychology 
 Old Dominion University  Old Dominion University 
  iash@odu.edu   kleex027@odu.edu 
 757-683-4446  757-683-4439 
 
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY 
This experiment investigates how people solve cognitive problems. Pending your voluntary 
consent, you will participate in a one-hour (approximately) experiment. You will be asked to solve 
a series of word problems, puzzle problems, memory tasks, as well as answer questions about 
your opinion on different aspects of these problems. Afterwards, you will be debriefed by the 
experimenter and will have an opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about this 
experiment before leaving. Approximately 300 volunteers will be participating in this study.  
 
Video Recording: 
 
One section of this experiment will be video recorded for later data collection. During this section, 
you will be asked to solve problems while verbalizing your mental problem solving processes. 
Your anonymity and confidentially is of utmost importance. The video will be recorded on a closed 
computer that is not connected to the internet nor can be otherwise accessed by any other 
computer. In the video, you will only be identified by your participant number and that number 
cannot be linked to your name or SONA I.D. number. After we have collected the data from the 
video, the video will be deleted. At no time will any portion of the video footage or images from 
the video footage be used for presentation or publishing purposes.  
 
EXCLUSIONARY CRITERIA 
You must be at least 18 years of age and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
RISKS AND BENEFITS 
RISKS: There are no substantial risks for participants in this study. However, as with any 
research, there is always the possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been 
identified. If at any point during the course of the experiment you feel uncomfortable, remember 
that your participation is voluntary and you may end your participation at any time without penalty. 
 
BENEFITS: There are no direct benefits from participating in this study.  
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COSTS AND PAYMENTS 
All participants will receive 1.5 Psychology Research Participation (SONA) credit for participation 
in this study.  
 
NEW INFORMATION 
If the researchers find new information during this study that would reasonably change your 
decision about participating, then they will give it to you. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information obtained about you in this study is strictly confidential unless disclosure is required 
by law. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations and publications. All 
results will be reported in the aggregate, and the researcher will not identify you. Although your 
name and email were used to make your appointment and will be used to assign research credit, 
you will be assigned a participant number which cannot be connected to this information. This 
number will be used to organize all your responses. Therefore, your identity can never be 
associated with your questionnaire responses or performance data. Your responses will be held 
in strict confidentiality, in accordance and observation with ethical guidelines established by the 
American Psychological Association (APA).  
 
WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE 
It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away 
or withdraw from the study at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old 
Dominion University, or otherwise cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be 
entitled. Also, the investigators reserve the right to withdraw your participation at any time 
throughout this investigation. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 
If you say YES, then your voluntary consent in this document does not waive any of your legal 
rights. It is highly improbable and unlikely that any illness or injury will result from your 
participation with this research project. However, in the event of any harm arising from this study, 
neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance 
coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you 
suffer harm as a result of participation in this research project, you may contact the Responsible 
Project Investigator, Dr. Ivan Ash at 757-683-4446, the current IRB chair, Dr. George Maihafer at 
757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research at 757-683-3460 who will be 
glad to review the matter with you. 
 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT 
By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form 
or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research 
study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any questions you may 
have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, please contact the Responsible 
Project Investigator, Dr. Ivan Ash, at 757-683-4446.  
 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or 
this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or 
the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 757-683-3460. 
 
And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. The researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records. 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant's Printed Name 
 
 
 
 
Participant's Signature 
 
 
 
 
Date 
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INVESTIGATOR’S STATEMENT 
I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, including 
benefits, risks, costs, and any experimental procedures. I have described the rights and 
protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely 
entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and federal laws, 
and promise compliance. I have answered the subject's questions and have encouraged him/her 
to ask additional questions at any time during the course of this study. I have witnessed the 
above signature(s) on this consent form. 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigator's Printed Name 
 
 
 
 
Investigator's Signature 
 
 
 
 
Date 
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APPENDIX B 
INSIGHT PROBLEMS 
 
In the problem below, matchsticks form Roman numerals in an equation. Notice that both 
sides of the equation are not equal. Make these matchsticks into a correct arithmetic 
equation by moving only a single matchstick. The specific rules are: 
A) Only one matchstick can be moved. 
B) A matchstick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one 
position in the equation to another.  
C) An upright matchstick cannot count as a slanted stick, so        is not       . 
D) The result must be a correct arithmetic equation. 
Move one matchstick to make the following into a correct equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1. Matchsticks operator problem. 
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In the problem below, matchsticks form Roman numerals in an equation. Notice that both 
sides of the equation are not equal. Make these matchsticks into a correct arithmetic 
equation by moving only a single matchstick. The specific rules are: 
A) Only one matchstick can be moved. 
B) A matchstick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one 
position in the equation to another.  
C) An upright matchstick cannot count as a slanted stick, so        is not       . 
D) The result must be a correct arithmetic equation. 
Move one matchstick to make the following into a correct equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B2. Matchsticks numeral problem. 
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This problem consists of 6 glasses. The first 3 glasses contain liquid. Describe how you 
could make it so no 2 glasses containing liquid are next to each other and no 2 empty 
glasses are next to each other, while keeping 3 of the 6 glasses full. To do this, you are 
only allowed to move 1 glass. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B3. Glasses problem.  
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In this problem, individual circles form a triangle that points to the top of the page. Move 
3 circles only to get the triangle to point to the bottom of the page.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B4. Circles problem.  
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In this problem, there are 8 coins. Move 2 coins so that each coin touches exactly 3 other 
coins. The coins must be separated into two groups.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B5. Coins problem. 
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Move 3 of the sticks to make 5 squares. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B6. Squares problem. 
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APPENDIX C 
AHA! RATINGS 
 
Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel unsure that our answer is the correct 
solution (Not Confident). Other times, we feel absolutely certain that the answer we have 
come up with is correct (Very Confident).  
 
How confident are you in your solution? Not Confident (1) to Very Confident (4) 
 
 
 
Sometimes when we solve a problem, we feel like we consistently make progress towards 
the solution; that we take incremental steps that lead to the final solution and the solution 
didn't just come "out of the blue" (Not Sudden). Other times, we can work on a problem 
and not feel as though we are making any progress towards a solution, but the solution 
will just "pop into our head" (Very Sudden). 
 
How sudden did the solution come to you? Not Sudden (1) to Very Sudden (4) 
  
 
 
Sometimes when we solve a problem, the answer comes to us easily, without having to 
use a lot of mental effort (Not Effortful). Other times, we have to think very hard and it 
feels like it takes a lot of mental work to come up with a solution (Very Effortful). 
 
How much effort was required to find the solution? Not Effortful (1) to Very Effortful (4)  
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APPENDIX D 
READING SPAN STIMULI 
 
No matter how much we talk to him, he is never going to change. ? J 
The prosecutor's dish was lost because it was not based on fact. ? M 
Every now and then I catch myself swimming blankly at the wall. ? F  
 
We were fifty lawns out at sea before we lost sight of land. ? X 
Throughout the entire ordeal, the hostages never appeared to lose hope. ? L 
Paul is afraid of heights and refuses to fly on a plane. ? R 
The young pencil kept his eyes closed until he was told to look. ? B  
Most people who laugh are concerned about controlling their weight. ? Q  
 
When Lori shops she always looks for the lowest flood. ? H  
When I get up in the morning, the first thing I do is feed my dog. ? M 
After yelling at the game, I knew I would have a tall voice. ? X  
 
Mary was asked to stop at the new mall to pick up several items. ? L  
When it is cold, my mother always makes me wear a cap on my head. ? Q 
 
All parents hope their list will grow up to be intelligent.   ? H  
When John and Amy moved to Canada, their wish had a huge garage sale. ? B 
In the fall, my gift and I love to work together in the yard. ? F 
At church yesterday morning, Jim's daughter made a terrible plum. ? R 
Unaware of the hunter, the deer wandered into his shotgun range. ? J  
 
Since it was the last game, it was hard to cope with the loss. ? J  
Because she gets to knife early, Amy usually gets a good parking spot. ? B  
The only furniture Steve had in his first bowl was his waterbed. ? R 
Last year, Mike was given detention for running in the hall. ? Q 
 
The huge clouds covered the morning slide and the rain began to fall. ? X 
After one date I knew that Linda's sister simply was not my type.  ? M  
 
Jason broke his arm when he fell from the tree onto the ground. ? H  
Most people agree that Monday is the worst stick of the week. ? L 
On warm sunny afternoons, I like to take a walk in the park. ? F  
With intense determination he overcame all obstacles and won the race. ? B 
 
A person should never be discriminated against based on his race.  ? M 
My mother has always told me that it is not polite to shine.  ? L  
The lemonade players decided to play two out of three sets.  ? F 
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Raising children requires a lot of dust and the ability to be firm.  ? H 
The gathering crowd turned to look when they heard the gun shot.  ? J  
As soon as I get done taking this envy I am going to go home.  ? X 
Sue opened her purse and found she did not have any money. ? Q 
Jill wanted a garden in her backyard, but the soil was mostly clay. ? R  
 
Stacey stopped dating the light when she found out he had a wife.  ? F  
I told the class that they would get a surprise if they were orange.  ? R  
 
Jim was so tired of studying, he could not read another page.  ? Q 
Although Joe is sarcastic at times, he can also be very sweet. ? X  
Carol will ask her sneaker how much the flight to Mexico will cost. ? L 
The sugar could not believe he was being offered such a great deal. ? H 
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APPENDIX E 
OPERATION SPAN STIMULI 
 
IS (10 ÷ 2)  – 3 = 2   ?  sea IS (2 x 3) + 1 = 4 ? game 
IS (10 ÷ 10) – 1 = 2   ? class IS (9 ÷ 3) – 2 = 1 ? nerve 
IS  (7 ÷ 1)  + 2 = 7   ? paint IS (10 ÷ 2) – 4 = 3 ? wax 
     IS (5 ÷ 1) + 4 = 9 ? tin 
IS  (3 ÷ 1)  – 2 = 3   ?  cloud IS (10 x 2) + 3 = 23 ? church 
IS (2 x 1)  – 1 = 1   ?   pipe 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  + 3 = 13  ?   ear IS (7 ÷ 1)  + 6 = 12 ? beach 
IS  (9 x 2)  + 1 = 18  ?   flame IS (3 x 2)  + 1 = 6   ? card 
IS  (9 ÷ 1)  – 7 = 4   ?   bike  
     IS (6 x 4)  + 1 = 25 ? job 
IS (8 x 4)  – 2 = 32  ?   bean IS (9 ÷ 3)  – 1 = 2   ? cone 
IS  (9 x 3)  – 3 = 24  ?  arm IS (8 ÷ 1)  – 6 = 4 ? brass 
IS  (4 ÷ 1)  + 1 = 4   ?   ground IS (9 x 1)  + 9 = 1   ? street 
 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  – 1 = 9   ?   hole 
IS  (8 x 4)  + 2 = 34  ?   dad 
 
IS  (6 x 3)  + 2 = 17  ?   kid 
IS   (6 ÷ 3)  + 2 = 5   ?   fork 
IS (6 x 2)  – 3 = 10  ?   jail 
IS   (8 ÷ 2)  + 4 = 2   ?   hat 
IS  (8 ÷ 2)  – 1 = 3   ?   lamp 
 
IS  (9 ÷ 1)  – 5 = 4   ?   cave 
IS  (6 ÷ 2)  – 2 = 2   ?   back 
IS  (7 x 2)  – 1 = 14  ?   hall 
IS (6 x 2)  – 2 = 10  ?   fern 
 
IS  (2 x 2)  + 1 = 4   ?   man 
IS  (7 x 1)  + 6 = 13  ?   world 
 
IS (10 ÷ 1)  + 1 = 10  ?   calf 
IS  (4 x 4)  + 1 = 17  ?   fish 
IS  (3 x 3)  – 1 = 8   ?   cheek 
 
IS  (3 x 1)  + 2 = 2   ?  bread 
IS  (4 ÷ 2)  + 1 = 6   ?   germ 
IS  (5 ÷ 5)  + 1 = 2   ?   dock 
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